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Tribal Innovations in Children’s Accounts 
 
 
 
An important frontier in savings policy and research is the effectiveness of accounts at birth. This paper presents ideas 
and initial findings from the experience of American Indian nations—America’s first asset-builders—with such 
policies. It describes the motivations for creating “minors’ accounts,” which are offered by approximately 70 tribes. 
These tribes are the only jurisdictions in the nation to offer universal, unrestricted accounts for children. Increasingly, 
they also are using conditions and incentives to promote their policy goals. Their experiences and ideas offer important 
insights for mainstream policy makers and program managers (in the US and elsewhere) about how to design effective 
children’s accounts policy. The paper closes by stressing a two-way flow of information, as ideas from experience and 
research in non-tribal communities offer new ways to strengthen tribal minors’ account policies and further their welfare-
enhancing goals. 
Key words: Native American; native assets; child savings; college savings; Child Development Accounts; policy 
The asset-building field has its genesis in the idea that things are not as they should be. The income 
supports available to low-income Americans (who are disproportionately people of color) are often 
insufficient to meet basic needs (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 2008). A growing number of 
policymakers are calling for an alternate strategy—asset building—because of its different promise. 
As Sherraden has famously said, “income may feed people’s stomachs, but assets change their 
heads” (Sherraden, 1991, pp. 155-6). 
At this moment in Native America’s history, these words provide important guidance. Especially 
since 1975, Indian nations (interchangeably termed tribes, Native nations, and Native communities 
in this paper) have had expanded opportunities for self-determination, and many tribal governments 
have leveraged these opportunities to generate new revenues. In other words, tribal governments, 
                                                 
The author is Research Director for both the Native Nations Institute for Leadership, Management, and Policy (NNI) 
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which once relied almost exclusively on transfer income, now have significant self-generated 
financial resources over which they have discretionary control. Such revenues present the tribal 
leaders and citizens with major decisions. How can a Native nation’s collective resources be spent or 
invested to best advance its interests? 
One option is to devote tribal government revenue to tribal government operations and 
government-provided services. Another is to treat the money as a tribal government surplus, which 
tribal government invests over the long-term to grow the assets of the nation. Similarly, it could re-
invest in tribal government businesses and grow the productive capacity of the Native nation. It also 
could distribute some portion of the revenue to citizens on a per capita basis. In fact, just over 70 of 
the 225 tribal governments that own gaming enterprises make such payments,1 and still more tribal 
governments make payments from other discretionary income sources (although there is no clear 
way to determine how many tribes do so).  
Widely referred to as “per capitas” or simply “per caps,” revenue distribution payments to tribal 
citizens may be made regularly (monthly or semi-annually, for example) or irregularly (one-off 
payments associated with a land settlement or periodic dividends from tribal enterprise earnings, for 
example). Generally, payments are made to all citizens—adults and children, with minors’ resources 
maintained in trust accounts until a specified age of majority (often age 18).  
Especially in the face of more trying economic times, citizen pressure for per capita payments—or 
for larger payments—has increased. Concurrently, Indian Country leaders are engaged in a non-
systematic, but progressing and increasingly inclusive conversation about the intents and results of 
distribution policies. What do tribal policymakers want the payments to do? Are they achieving 
those purposes? How do they fit with the nations’ overarching goals of promoting self-
determination and strengthening sovereignty?  
In this process of reflection, “per capita tribes” (those that distribute a portion of tribal government 
revenues to citizens) are beginning to make their experiences available to the broader asset-building 
field. Because so many Native nations manage minors’ accounts (per capita distributions held in 
trust for young tribal citizens), much tribal information has relevance to mainstream conversations 
about child savings accounts (CSAs). This paper first addresses that comparability. Tribal minors’ 
accounts are born of somewhat different motivations than mainstream CSAs, but they share a 
number of characteristics. Thus, Indian Country offers a natural experiment regarding CSAs, which 
may speak to important research questions in the field overall. The paper then turns to accumulated 
learning. What has been learned so far from the experiences of Native communities? The appraisal 
draws attention to two typical features of Indian Country minors’ accounts that are much less 
common in the mainstream—universality and unrestricted use.2 The paper’s final topic is the need for an 
ongoing, two-way flow of information. Especially given the growing momentum for—and growing 
number of—CSAs in the mainstream, as-yet unstudied tribal experiences can provide valuable new 
information to the field. Similarly, ideas, experience, and research in non-tribal communities offer 
new ways to strengthen tribal minors’ account policies and further their welfare-enhancing goals. 
                                                 
1 National Indian Gaming Association, “Indian Gaming Facts,” retrieved on August 4, 2009, from 
http://www.indiangaming.org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml. 
2 Notably, Native nations that offer minors’ accounts are the only jurisdictions in the U.S. where every child is endowed 
with a savings account at birth. 
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Before embarking, a caveat is necessary: the issues addressed in this paper are politically sensitive, 
and tribal policymakers are often reluctant to speak publicly about issues related to per capita 
distributions. In consideration, this paper presents policy data that are already publicly available and 
otherwise reports more generalized tribal experiences. While detailed, individual-level data are 
desirable (see the final section of this paper), research must be in the joint interest of Native nations 
and assets policy investigators. The individuals whose lives are touched by tribal assets policies are 
not mere “research subjects,” but citizens of sovereign Native nations whose governments 
appropriately protect their privacy.  
A Brief History of Asset Building in Indian Country 
Historically, North America’s Native peoples were asset-rich. Land, whether held in common, in 
more individualized tenancy arrangements, or both, was their most important asset.3 Depending on 
a tribe’s economic and social goals, land was worked for agricultural production, reshaped to 
optimize hunting and gathering, or transformed to support larger scale settlement. For example, 
modern scholarship now paints this picture of New England in the 1500s:  
New England’s major river valleys…held large, permanent villages, many nestled in 
constellations of suburban hamlets and hunting camps. Because extensive fields of 
maize, beans, and squash surrounded every home, these settlements sprawled along 
the Connecticut, Charles, and other river valleys for miles, one town bumping up 
against the other (Mann, 2005, p. 42). 
In other words, besides holding assets, Native Americans worked, saved, and traded to develop 
assets. As the excerpt intimates, they developed housing assets (such as tipis, wickiups, hogans), 
personal and family assets (such as horses, boats, farming and fishing tools, cooking and food 
processing equipment, and trade goods), and community assets (such as hunting camps, gathering 
places, and worship centers). Some Native peoples also built asset holdings for investment in 
community relations and prestige (see E. Brown, quoted in Hicks, Edwards, Dennis, & Finsel, 
2005); these accumulations for potlatches, giveaways, and other ceremonial exchanges were often 
substantial.4 
Yet most U.S.-based Native peoples also experienced a long period of asset deprivation, born of 
colonization. Through forced removal, war, confinement on reservations, restricted access to 
traditional territories and resources, expropriation of natural resources, theft and other unscrupulous 
practices, flooding for dam building, pollution, and so on, tribes across North America were plunged 
into a near assetless state for at least a century.  
Contemporary observers and historians testify to this deprivation. Watching involuntary emigrants 
on the Trail of Tears, Alexis de Tocqueville notes,  
                                                 
3 Land tenancy and use arrangements among Indigenous North Americans were complex and diverse, varying according 
to tribes’ economic and cultural norms; see, for example, Driver (1975, pp. 269-283). 
4 “The maximum number of each material item exchanged at any single Kwakiutl potlatch from 1729 to 1936 will give 
an idea of the immensity of some of these affairs: 6 slaves, 54 dressed elk skins, 8 canoes, 3 coppers, 2,000 silver 
bracelets, 7,000 brass bracelets, 33,000 blankets. As many as 50 seals were eaten at the accompanying feast” (Driver, 
1974, p. 210). 
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At the end of the year 1831, I was…at the place the Europeans called Memphis. …A 
numerous band of Choctaws…were leaving their country and seeking to pass over to 
the right bank of the Mississippi, where they hoped to find an asylum promised to 
them by the American government…They had neither tents nor wagons, but only 
some provisions and weapons” (de Tocqueville, 1988, p. 324).  
A visitor to Pawnee Country (modern-day Nebraska) wrote in the 1840s: “one third of them had, 
neighter [sic] a kernel of corn nor a mouthful of meat in the world” (J. Dunbar, quoted in Milner, 
1982, p. 32). By the 1860s in what is now California, “the majority of Indians found themselves 
virtually landless…Natives were reduced to a marginal existence on the fringes of settler 
communities” (Wilson, 1998, p. 239). 
In fact, one of the most touted asset-building policies for non-Natives, the Homestead Act of 1862, 
contributed to this asset stripping. Together with the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, it provided both 
a moral justification and policy framework for depriving tribes of land. Native Americans already 
had lost a majority of their land through broken treaties and confinement to reservations. The 
Homestead and Dawes Acts led to the loss of 87 million more acres, or two-thirds of the lands 
supposedly “reserved” for Native Americans (Limerick 1987). During this period, the Lakota leader 
Red Cloud described his losses:  
You see this barren waste…Think of it! I, who used to own rich soil in a well-
watered country so extensive that I could not ride through it in a week on my fastest 
pony, am put down here! Why, I have to go five miles for wood for my fire. 
Washington took our lands and promised to feed and support us. Now I, who used 
to control 5,000 warriors, must tell Washington when I am hungry (recorded by W. 
K. Moorhead, quoted in Wilson, 1998, p. 293). 
Fortunately, Native nations’ opportunities to renew their asset bases changed dramatically in the 
1960s and 1970s. U.S. government policy (as exemplified by the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975) shifted in favor of tribal self-determination and “nation 
rebuilding.” Increased tribal government control of resources and changes in tribes’ political 
standing led to new opportunities for economic development. As noted above, tribes generated new 
tribal government revenue—through land settlements, legal claims, natural-resource extraction 
activities, modest taxation, and government-owned enterprises.5 The latter include businesses as 
diverse as mining operations, assembly plants, industrial parks, telecom businesses, organic farms, 
big-game hunts, and ski resorts. 
Not only Native nation governments but also Native nation citizens have benefited from these 
efforts to rebuild Indigenous assets. In the 1990s and 2000s, two forces in particular have 
heightened attention to individual and family asset building. The first is the success of tribal 
government-owned casino enterprises. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 clarified tribes’ 
rights to regulate gambling on tribal land, and by the late 1990s, numerous tribal governments 
(especially those near metro areas or leisure travel destinations) enjoyed significant revenue gains—
and per capita distribution policies often followed on the heels of this success.  
                                                 
5 These are comparable to “state-owned enterprises” in the mainstream economics literature. 
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A second force increasing the attention paid to individual asset building is the rise of a movement 
focusing on asset building for tribal community and tribal citizen empowerment. This effort 
(pioneered by the First Nations Development Institute but now a priority for many organizations 
supporting Native development) identifies asset control as a key determinant of Native peoples’ 
historical and contemporary economic health. Today, a growing number of tribes have integrated 
citizen-focused asset-building programs—ranging from financial education, homebuyer education, 
and entrepreneurship promotion to Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) campaigns, matched savings 
programs, and access to community development finance institutions (CDFIs)—into their overall 
economic development strategies.6  
This history provides context for the discussion that follows, but it also is offered as a reminder that 
the push for tribal government revenue generation and for revenue distribution policies is 
inextricably tied to a history of asset loss. This paper is about one of the attempts that tribes are 
making to reverse it. 
Motivations for Per Capita Distributions and Minors’ Accounts 
Native nation leaders and citizens have offered a variety of rationales for per capita tribal 
government revenue distributions. The following is a summary of common arguments for payments 
(significantly, there is an equally long list of reasons against them):7 
 Per capita payments help tribal citizens meet urgent needs. Where jobs are few and incomes 
are low, revenue distributions can be critical sources of support. 
 Payments diminish paternalism by shifting decisions about how money should be used from 
the government to citizens, who have the best knowledge about their own needs.  
 If a Native government wastes money, per capitas may have a greater impact on citizens’ 
lives than increased funding for government operations, programs, and initiatives.8 
 Channeling all tribal revenues into tribal government encourages dependency, or the view 
that it is the government’s job to provide for citizen needs.  
 Per capita distributions help prevent unnecessary tribal government growth and discourage 
the bureaucratization of functions that could remain in citizens’ own hands.  
 Per capita payments are an equalizer when some citizens—for political, geographic, or other 
reasons—are otherwise excluded from the benefits of tribal economic activity. 
                                                 
6 Not all programs are offered in every community, but it is more typical for a group of programs, rather than just a 
single program, to be offered; see First Nations Development Institute (2007) for more details. 
7 This list draws substantially from previous work of the lead author; see Cornell, Jorgensen, Rainie, Record, Seelau, & 
Starks (2008). The paper also makes explicit the many arguments against issuing per capita payments. 
8 This argument—and the next two—parallel common arguments in the U.S. as a whole for lower taxes. 
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 Used strategically, distributions can be an effective policy tool in support of everything from 
school attendance to well-baby check-ups. 
 Tribal citizens are shareholders in the tribal estate. This is their money. 
Although at first glance, asset building does not appear to be one of the reasons that tribal citizens 
have pursued per capita payments, the “waste and fraud,” “discourage dependency,” and “tribal 
estate” arguments have at least a flavor of asset building. Moreover, tribal leaders indicate that while 
they may not have used this terminology when initial policy decisions were made, individual citizen 
and family asset building has been part of their intent for per capita distributions from the outset. 
The hope was that seeding assets today would create increased individual and community wealth in 
the future. This goal is most obvious in the trust accounts tribes have established for minor citizens; 
distribution monies are deposited regularly and accumulate until the child reaches adulthood.  
Yet the point is not to extol the positives of per capita payments; it is to underscore several 
important differences between tribal trust accounts and mainstream CSAs. First, tribal minors’ 
accounts originate from a different (or more diffuse) logic than do CSAs. They are as much a 
product of popular demand as they are of elite policymakers’ benevolence. Second, because minors’ 
accounts are essentially per capita payments to youthful citizens, they necessarily replicate 
characteristics of those payments. If a tribe’s younger citizens are eligible for distribution payments, 
minors’ accounts are established for all of them, without deposit requirements or matching policies.9 
And while Native child accounts are sometimes structured to include conditions on the timing of 
account maturity and the dollar amount received, once Native citizens receive access to their 
accounts, there are no restrictions on how the money may be spent. As compared to the U.S. 
mainstream, universality and unrestricted use are distinct Indian Country policy features that merit 
research and analysis. 
Minors’ Accounts as CSAs 
Of course, there also are substantial similarities between tribal minors’ accounts and CSAs. Typical 
minors trust accounts have these familiar characteristics: 
 They are established for a tribe’s citizens at birth (or from the point at which citizenship in 
the community is confirmed). 
 The tribal government makes deposits/payments into the accounts. 
 Account funds are held in trust for the Native nation’s minor citizens. 
 Account holders (and their parents or guardians) receive regular reports on the value of the 
accounts. 
                                                 
9 Minors may be ineligible for distribution payments in some Native nations. However, it appears that for the majority 
of tribes making distributions, minors’ accounts are the norm. 
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 Minor children (and their parents or guardians) have limited or no access to account funds 
before the account holder reaches adulthood. 
 Account holders receive access to funds upon maturity, although account holders who do 
have not met certain benchmarks may receive funds somewhat later.  
Using publicly available data, Table 1 provides more detail on the policies, regulations, and 
procedures of several tribes with respect to these points. Importantly, the list of examples is not 
exhaustive: all tribes that sponsor minors’ accounts do so through governing policies and 
regulations. Clearly, Native nations’ experience with minors’ accounts is extensive. 
 
Table 1. Examples of tribal CSA policies 
Characteristic Example 
Accounts at 
birth 
Stockbridge-Munsee Communitya: “Newborns: All babies born after March 1, but prior to 
June 1, and whose applications for enrollment have been properly submitted to the Land and 
Enrollment Office by July 31 shall be eligible for the payment from this fiscal year. Payment shall 
be paid to the Minors’ Trust Fund upon completion of the enrollment process.” (Italics 
added; babies born June-February become eligible for distributions in the following fiscal 
year.) 
Tunica-Biloxi Tribeb: “When a child is born to a tribal member, the tribal parent takes steps 
to enroll the minor [as a tribal citizen]. Once enrolled, the finance department moves to 
establish a trust account for the child after the parent has completed a Trust Adoption 
Agreement (TAA).” 
Tribal 
government  
payments into 
accounts 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indiansc: “Per capita payments shall be made two times each year 
to all competent adult members eligible for the distribution as set forth in section 16C-4. 
Likewise, an appropriate share shall be set aside twice each year in the Minors Trust Fund…”
Hoopa Valley Tribed: “Per capita payments shall be made four times annually, on the second 
Wednesday of the months of March, June, August and December.” 
Tunica-Biloxi Tribeb: “From the point that the TAA [Trust Adoption Agreement] is executed, 
the tribe begins making monthly deposits in the minor’s trust account.” 
Funds held in 
trust 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indianse: “The distributions to enrolled tribal members who are 
minors…shall be maintained in trust for the benefit of the minor until he or she reaches the 
age majority...The Trust Officer shall be responsible for setting up and managing a trust 
account or accounts with an appropriate financial or investment institution to maintain 
distribution funds… The form of the trust account (for example, individual trust accounts for 
each minor or one trust account for all minors) shall be at the discretion of the Trust Officer, 
so long as the balance and accumulated earnings can be separately identified and monitored 
for each individual with funds held in trust and the account or accounts meet fiduciary 
standards.” 
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Funds held in 
trust 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indiansc: “The Tribe shall establish a legal trust (hereinafter ‘the 
Minors Trust Fund’) for the benefit of all minor members and legally incompetent members 
who shall be eligible for per capita payments… The Trustees shall select an institutional 
Manager and such other advisors as they deem necessary, with suitable expertise and discre-
tion to administer the Minors Trust Fund and invest its assets. The Minors Trust Fund shall 
be invested in a reasonable and prudent manner so as to protect the principal and seek a 
reasonable return. The Minors Trust Fund shall be established as a ‘grantor’ trust, under 
which the Tribe is the grantor and owner of the trust for the benefit of its enrolled minor and 
incompetent members.” 
Stockbridge-Munsee Communitya: “The Tribal Council hereby authorizes that per capita 
payments designated for minor qualified tribal members shall be deposited into a ‘Minors’ 
Trust Fund’ established in a low-risk interest bearing account in a federally insured financial 
institution, and in accordance with any trust agreement the Tribe may have with a trustee. If 
the minor qualified tribal member will be eligible to receive the per capita payment directly by 
the end of the upcoming fiscal year, the Tribal Treasurer may instead deposit the per capita 
payment into a federally insured certificate of deposit, if it is to the financial benefit of the 
minor.” 
Regular reports 
to account 
holders 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indianse: “Reports of trust account status, including 
accumulated earnings, shall be sent on an annual basis to the parent or legal custodian of the 
minor whose distribution funds are being held in trust.” 
Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Communityf: “The Tribal Council shall make available a 
monthly bank statement of any monies placed into trust for a minor or individual declared 
legally incompetent to the legal guardian of such person.” 
Tulalip Tribesg: Parents and account holders “will receive quarterly statements showing 
account balance and earnings.” 
Regular reports 
to account 
holders 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indianse: “Reports of trust account status, including 
accumulated earnings, shall be sent on an annual basis to the parent or legal custodian of the 
minor whose distribution funds are being held in trust.” 
Prairie Island Mdewakanton Dakota Communityf: “The Tribal Council shall make available a 
monthly bank statement of any monies placed into trust for a minor or individual declared 
legally incompetent to the legal guardian of such person.” 
Tulalip Tribesg: Parents and account holders “will receive quarterly statements showing 
account balance and earnings.” 
Limited or no 
access during 
accumulation 
period 
Hoopa Valley Tribed: “For each per capita payment made to a minor Tribal member who has 
not demonstrated proof of emancipation, the Tribe shall deposit into an IIM [Individual 
Indian Money] account at least one-half of each payment of less than or equal to $1,500.00 
and at least two-thirds of each payment of more than $1,500.00. …The money is not to be 
released until such minor reaches the age of eighteen (18) or otherwise becomes 
emancipated.” (IIM accounts are interest-bearing accounts administered by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs.) 
Tulalip Tribesg: Early withdrawal of a child’s trust account funds is not allowed. “The only 
exceptions are: (1) if the minor has a terminal illness or (2) the minor has a documented 
serious medical condition requiring long term care. The trust is restricted because other more 
basic health, education and welfare needs of the child may be met though the parents electing 
to receive 50% of their child's per capita payment to provide for their child's needs.”  
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Receipt of funds 
upon maturity 
or achievement 
of benchmark 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Communityh: “The Tribe shall hold in trust, for the 
benefit of each minor member of the Tribe, such amounts as are made available for 
withdrawal by enrolled members of the Tribe in the form of investment benefits, until each 
reaches the 21 years of age, or as otherwise provided by this ordinance… [However], upon 
reaching the age of 18, members who have completed high school or received their GED 
may petition for an early withdrawal of all or a portion of the balance of trust funds held on 
their behalf for the purpose of education or a down payment on a home.” 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indianse: “Upon reaching the age of majority (18), a newly adult 
tribal member may request that any and all amounts (plus accumulated earnings) shall be 
distributed in a lump sum to the member… If the tribal member does not validly request that 
disbursement within five (5) years, the existing account funds shall be moved to the 
Unclaimed Funds Account…” 
Hoopa Valley Tribed: No payment from an IIM [Individual Indian Money] account that has 
accumulated prior to a Tribal Member reaching the age of eighteen (18) shall be accessed, 
unless said Tribal member has graduated from high school or has earned a General 
Equivalency Diploma (GED). Such specific per capita trust funds shall be held in a specific 
per capita trust account. Upon graduation from high school or obtaining a GED, or when the 
person reaches the age of twenty-one (21) years old, said specific per capita trust funds held 
shall be paid to the Tribal member. 
Tunica-Biloxi Tribeb: The term of this trust shall last, as to any beneficiary, until that 
beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one (21) years and further that each beneficiary shall 
have taken a financial planning course of no less than six (6) in-classroom hours of 
instruction. 
Sources:  
a. Stockbridge Munsee Community Band of Mohican Indians, Tribal Code of Ordinances, Chapter 27, 
Revenue Allocation Plan, retrieved on August 2, 2009, from http://mohican-
nsn.gov/Departments/Legal/Ordinances/Ch%2027%20Revenue%20Allocation%20Plan.pdf. 
b. Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, “Second Amended and Restated Master Trust Document,” retrieved on 
August 2, 2009, from http://www.tunicabiloxi.org/PDF/2ndAmendMTD.pdf, and “Council Reviews Trust 
Programs,” Tribal News, 2007, retrieved on August 2, 2009, from 
http://www.tunicabiloxi.org/article_trust_program_review.php.   
c. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Cherokee Code, Chapter 16C, Allocation and Per Capita Distribution of 
Gaming Net Revenue, retrieved on August 2, 2009, from 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech16cgamingrev.htm. 
d. Hoopa Valley Tribe, Tribal Code Title 40, Per Capita Ordinance, retrieved on August 2, 2009, from 
http://doc.narf.org/nill/Codes/hoopacode/t40percap.htm. e. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of 
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Universality and Unrestricted Use 
These comparisons argue that Indian Country offers a natural experiment regarding CSAs, to which 
the mainstream ought to be paying attention. Experience and research in Native communities can 
speak to important questions in the field overall. For example, what policies and practices are 
associated with “effective” CSAs? What account designs meet the goals of growing assets, building 
financial literacy, stabilizing individuals and families, and changing financial behavior? Two of the 
distinct characteristics of tribal minors’ accounts—universality and unrestricted use—offer initial 
opportunities for policy learning. The benefits and challenges of these characteristics are considered 
below. 
Universality supports the ideal of fair treatment, a democratic benefit in all societies. It also raises the 
probability of a “greater-than-the-sum-of-the-parts” community-level benefit: rising individual and 
family incomes and changed behaviors might give rise to a new growth path for a community’s 
economy overall. More prosaically, universality may decrease administrative costs through automatic 
program enrollment and reductions in either recruitment or selection efforts. Recruitment costs are 
high when it is difficult to meet program enrollment goals10; selection costs are high where programs 
are over-subscribed. But if a child’s CSA can be opened once proof of birth or citizenship is 
established (through application for a Social Security or tribal identity card, for example), there is 
little need to spend additional time recruiting participants or determining their eligibility.11  
Truly unrestricted use carries a similar administrative benefit: no time need be spent matching 
disbursements to designated asset-building activities. While largely undocumented, these costs are 
not trivial. Summarizing the findings from surveys of financial institutions conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Center for Community Capitalism, Cytron and Reid note, “The 
start-up and administrative costs of running an IDA program can also be high. In addition to 
holding accounts, financial institutions are often involved with submitting the paperwork for match 
funds and monitoring accounts for unauthorized withdrawals” (2005, p. 12, italics added).  
Unrestricted use also supports the economists’ ideal for utility maximization—that individuals know 
best what kinds of spending will improve their wellbeing. By contrast, when CSAs place restrictions 
on the kinds of purchases participants can make, they constrain these consumers’ achievable optima 
and “reduce utility.” Taking the argument one step further, restrictions also suggest a lack of 
                                                 
10 In Indian Country—and elsewhere—managers of limited-enrollment pilot programs in asset building have reported 
difficulty in recruiting sufficient participants, which translates to higher administrative costs; see, for example, Morris 
(2007). 
11 Certainly, Native nations spend a considerable amount of administrative time determining who is and who is not a 
tribal citizen, and the activity level increases (at least for a time) when a tribe initiates a per capita distribution. Because 
state and country populations are so much larger than tribal populations, however, it is hard to imagine that initiating 
CSAs would have more than a marginal impact on the administrative effort they expend on citizenship determinations. 
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conviction about the effectiveness of asset-building policy. If financial education is successful and 
assets do transform how people envision their financial futures (the “head changing” effect cited by 
Sherraden), the policy should be working at the level of preferences, and policymakers should be 
able to trust account holders to make the best choices for their specific circumstances.  
For practical reasons, this argument is not terribly persuasive. A similar, more compelling point is 
that no one really knows whether the restricted list of assets for investment right. Members of 
communities that have different cultural mores than mainstream America have questioned the idea 
that investments in education, small business development, and home ownership are the primary 
means of transforming the asset and wealth trajectories of individuals, families, and communities. As 
one tribal citizen asked at a Native asset building coalition meeting, “when are IDA researchers 
going to look at the impact of investing in other assets, like community-held assets?”12 What if the 
short-list of assets approved for CSA use are not the optimal assets for strengthening Native 
communities? What if they do not resonate with culturally legitimate concepts of asset ownership 
and accumulation? Then, even well-meaning policies and programs—meant to serve those formerly 
excluded from the asset-building path to economic prosperity—will miss the mark. Until these 
questions are resolved, it might be better to allow account holders discretion in their asset 
conversion decisions. In one interpretation, this is what longitudinal impact studies of the Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians’ revenue distribution show (Akee, Copeland, Keeler, Angold, & Costello, 
forthcoming; Costello, Compton, Keeler, & Angold, 2003); with pure additions to income, recipients 
apparently have invested in a variety of human capital-increasing strategies, with positive results. 
Most persuasively, however, tribal policymakers understand unrestricted asset use as a powerful 
policy tool for behavior modification. If a youth sees himself as the recipient of an account which he 
can claim upon his majority regardless of whether he pursues higher education, buys a home, or 
starts a business, there is an opportunity for tribal governments to use the expectation of an account 
as a lever on behavior for all youth account holders, not just those whose plans align with the CSA 
goals.  
Tribal governments are experimenting with a variety of regulations for deterring undesirable 
behavior via per capita payments. These laws may be aimed primarily at adult citizens, but most do 
not appear to exclude minors—and some actively target youth. One Native nation deducts from 
parents’ and children’s payments when a child is truant from school.13 Some tribes reduce citizens’ 
revenue shares if they are convicted of certain crimes.14 Most Native nations garnish distributions 
                                                 
12 Question posed to Miriam Jorgensen at the Native Financial Education Coalition Strategic Planning Convening, 
Seattle, WA, February 20, 2008.  
13 “Weary of poor grades and low graduation rates, the Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation [levies] a minimum of $100-a-
day fines on families whose kids skip school… The get-tough fines escalate in increments of $50 for each new offense, 
meaning that families with chronically or tardy students can be charged thousands of dollars… For kids 13 and younger, 
the money comes out of parents' casino dividends and other tribal payments. But for kids 14 or older, the fines are 
double: half is paid by parents, the other half by the teen. The students’ fines are deducted from the tribal money they 
receive when they turn 18” (Sowers, 2005, retrieved on August 3, 2009, from 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/0531truant31.html).   
14 For example, Chapter 16 of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Code, Section C-4 (Membership and Eligibility) 
specifies a three strikes rule: “Any member of the Eastern Band who has been convicted on three separate occasions of 
any drug offense, or any offense for which exclusion is allowed whether or not that punishment has been imposed, shall 
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for unpaid child support15 and for debt owed to the tribal government.16 This blanket “debt owed” 
provision allows Native nations to address issues from substance abuse (where the debt may be 
payment for court-ordered treatment) to misuse of public housing (where the debt may be the cost 
of cleanup and repair).17 While they are reductions from a distribution for negative behaviors rather 
than new payments conditional upon positive actions, these policies have a great deal in common 
with conditional cash transfers, which have a strong record outside Indian Country.18 Indeed, given 
loss aversion (people’s tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains), reducing 
payments may be a more powerful tool for behavior change than conditional payments.  
Of course there are disadvantages to universality and unrestricted use too. For one, incentives 
associated with selective participation and restricted use disappear. Restoring incentives is an 
increasing focus for tribes; they are especially focused on restoring incentives for educational 
attainment (which despite foregoing arguments, shows tribal leaders’ agreement with mainstream 
policymakers that education is a transformational asset) and actual asset investment.  
Many tribes motivate high school completion by deferring account awards for young citizens 
without a degree. Typically, tribes prevent those without a high school degree or equivalent from 
accessing minors’ trust accounts until age 21 (for examples, see the “receipt of funds upon maturity 
                                                                                                                                                             
forfeit his or her right to receive per capita distributions of net gaming proceeds. This section shall apply only to 
offenses that occur after the effective date of this section. The Cherokee Court shall notify the Tribal Finance Office of 
any person to whom this section applies” (retrieved on August 2, 2009, from 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech16cgamingrev.htm). 
15 For example, Title 2 of the Ho-Chunk Nation Code, Section 8 (Claims Against Per Capita Ordinance), specifies: “The 
following claims shall be recognized and enforced by the Nation against a Per Capita Share at the time of Payment of 
the Per Capita Distribution of which it is a part and prior to the distribution of such Per Capita Share to a Tribal 
Member: … Any order of  garnishment issued by the Trial Court for purposes of child support pursuant to the 
Recognition of Foreign Child Support Orders Ordinance, the Children's Code or other applicable law of the Nation” (retrieved 
on August 3, 2009, from http://www.ho-chunknation.com/UserFiles/2HCC08_Claims.pdf). 
16 For example, Title 28, Hoopa Valley Tribal Code, Section 11.2 (Tribal Debt Collection Ordinance, per capita 
payments section), specifies: “Per capita payments are authorized to be applied, in part of in full, with or without first 
obtaining a judgment, toward any debt of any Tribal member to a Tribal entity” (retrieved on August 3, 2009, from 
http://www.hoopa-nsn.gov/documents/Codes/Title28-UniformDebtCollection.pdf).  
Chapter 16 of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Code, Section C-5(d)(2) (Garnishment for debts owed) sets for a 
full list: “The Tribe, or a Tribal entity as defined in this chapter, may administratively garnish a member’s per capita 
payment to reimburse the Tribe or the Tribal entity for any outstanding fees, costs, rent, judgments, user fees, or other 
charges owed to the Tribe or the Tribal entity” (op cit.). 
17 For example, the Couer d’Alene Tribal Housing Authority Drug and Alcohol Policy, Section 8 (Per Capita 
Garnishment), notes: “In those cases in which the tenant(s) facing eviction proceedings is an enrolled Coeur d’Alene 
tribal member and the reason for eviction involves noncompliance with this policy…capita payments made by the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe to the tenant(s) will be subject to garnishment for…vacated damages, including but not limited to: 
1. Delinquent amounts owed, 2. Testing of home for drug use, 3. Clean up costs, 4. Repair costs, 5. Administrative costs 
associated with bringing the vacated home to livable condition” (retrieved on August 3, 2009, from 
http://www.cdatribe-nsn.gov/docs/housing/2009/drugPolicy.pdf). 
18 Conditional payments have been used throughout the developing world (see the Foreign Policy Association’s 
discussion, retrieved on August 3, 2009, from http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id 
=522390) and have been tested in targeted low-income communities in New York City (see presentation retrieved on 
August 3, 2009, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/280558-
1138289492561/CCTinNY_9-17-07.pdf). 
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or achievement of benchmark” row of Table 1); others have phased or even later payouts based on 
high school completion.19 To encourage higher education, some Native nations provide additional 
tuition support for students who enter college.20 Anecdotal reports suggest that some tribes also are 
experimenting with policies that tie minors’ account access and per capita payment amounts to 
higher education outcomes. Extending the high school completion incentive, for example, tribes 
might disburse a certain percentage of a minor trust account’s value when the student receives a 
diploma or GED and pay out the remainder when the student receives a college degree; students 
who do not complete college would have to wait longer to receive the remainder of their money. Or, 
per capita distributions might be matched to a citizen’s higher education credentials, with the 
distribution amount rising as credentials rise.  
Countering the “blow it all” tendency—and restoring the incentive to convert current dollars into 
assets that build wealth for the future—is harder. Some tribes have borrowed a page from the trust 
advisers that serve the wealthy, and pay out trust balances over time. Young citizens may not take 
control of the entirety of their funds until their late 20s or mid-30s.21 Some tribes continue the 
                                                 
19 For example, the Stockbridge-Munsee begins to phase in payments from age 18 onward, as soon as a young tribal 
citizen gains a high school degree. The Stockbridge-Munsee Tribal Law, Chapter 27 (Revenue Allocation Plan), Section 
27.7(C)(3) specifies: “Beneficiaries shall be eligible for the receiving payment of the monies accumulated in the Minors' 
Trust Fund, including interest, less expenses, for the particular beneficiary, provided that the minor qualified tribal 
member has participated in a the financial planning/investment consultation with the Trustee’s financial advisor and: (a) 
Upon reaching the age of eighteen (18), provided that the tribal member has graduated high school or obtained a 
G.E.D., the beneficiary shall be paid 25% of the balance of their portion of the Minor’s Trust Fund. (b) Upon reaching 
the age of nineteen (19), provided that the tribal member has graduated high school or obtained a G.E.D., the 
beneficiary shall be paid 25% of the of the balance of their portion of the Minor’s Trust Fund. (c) Upon reaching the 
age of twenty (20), provided that the tribal member has graduated high school or obtained a G.E.D., the beneficiary 
shall be paid 25% of the balance of their portion of the Minor’s Trust Fund. (d) Upon reaching the age of twenty-one 
(21), the beneficiary shall be paid the remaining balance of their portion of the Minor’s Trust Fund (retrieved August 3, 
2009, from http://mohican-nsn.gov/Departments/Legal/Ordinances/ 
Ch%2027%20Revenue%20Allocation%20Plan.pdf). 
The Ho-Chunk Nation delays disbursement to age 25 in the absence of high school degree. The Ho-Chunk Nation 
Code, Title 2, Section 12 (Per Capita Distribution Ordinance), Article 8b(1) states: “The trust assets of each such 
account maintained for a minor shall be disbursed to the Member-beneficiary thereof upon the earlier of (i) said 
Member-beneficiary meeting the dual criteria if (a) reaching the age of eighteen (18) and (b) producing evidence of 
personal acquisition of a high school diploma to the Department of Enrollment (HSED, GED, or any similar substitute 
shall not be acceptable), or (ii) the Member reaches the age of twenty-five (25)” (retrieved on August 3, 2009, from 
http://www.ho-chunknation.com/UserFiles/2HCC12_Per%20Cap.pdf). 
20 For example, Saipe, Goralka, & DeStefano (2002) point to three programs of tribes in the San Diego County region. 
The Barona Band of Mission Indians “provides college scholarships up to $15,000/year for tribal members who want to 
attend college; however, the Education Committee approves scholarships for greater amounts, if needed” (p. 17). The 
Campo Kumeyaay Nation “provides transportation, tuition and books to Members who wish to further their education” 
(p. 21). The Viejas Band of Kumeyaay makes “full scholarships for vocational training, college or university 
education…available to all Members who maintain attendance and grade requirements” (p. 82).  
21 For example, the Prairie Island Indian Community revised fifth Gaming Revenue Allocation Ordinance (no. 98-3-25-
37) states: “The Tribal Council shall place…the per capita payment of every minor into a trust to be entitled the 
‘Irrevocable Minor’s Trust of the Prairie Island Indian Community in the State of Minnesota’ and shall be administered 
by an independent institutional trustee. The principal and interest shall be disbursed to the parent or legal guardian of a 
minor or the minor in accordance with the trust document that shall allow for the following distributions: Distributions 
Directly to Minor as Follows: Twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal at age 18; Twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
principal at age 21; Twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal at age 25; Twenty-five percent (25%) of the principal at 
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practice of paying distribution funds into an investment account after a youth reaches maturity, 
clearing showing that funds withdrawn diminish the amount invested for the future.22 Other tribes 
use secondary accounts to encourage a “spend some, save some” approach (see the “limited or no 
access during accumulation period, Hoopa Valley Tribe” row of Table 1). 
Much discussion, however, has focused on financial and investor education as a means of ensuring 
wise use of resources when an account matures. For example, in May 2007 over 500 tribal leaders 
gathered to identify an economic plan for Indian Country at the National Native American 
Economic Policy Summit. One of their recommendations focused specifically on the development 
of “programs that provide incentives for young people and others receiving per capita payments, to 
invest their money in higher yielding, longer term assets that will stabilize their financial position and 
expand economic opportunity” (NCAI & USDOI, 2007, recommenddation 61). Summiteers also 
identified the more general needs for “more specific training focused on investment and business 
management skills for tribal leaders and members” and “comprehensive financial literacy” (ibid., 
recommendations 14 and 15). 
Leaders of thriving Native nations note that their youth are growing up in communities that are only 
“20 years rich,” having faced multi-generational poverty prior to the economic success born of 
increased self-determination. In these circumstances, even adult citizens may lack personal financial 
skills, ruling out a usual route for skill transfer—parents teaching children (Jorgensen & Mandell, 
2007). Leaders also characterize their task as having 18 years to prepare tribal youth to “win the 
lottery”—pointing to research showing that, on average, lottery winners are further behind 
financially five years after buying the winning ticket than they were before (Hankins, Hoekstra, & 
Skiba, 2009). These challenges argue that tribal youth need deliberate financial education in order to 
gain the financial skills (budgeting, saving, banking, investing) and attitudes necessary to manage 
their minors’ accounts for wealth building upon maturity.  
                                                                                                                                                             
age 31; and One hundred percent (100%) of the net interest income at age 35” (retrieved on August 3, 2009, from 
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/ 
gamingordinances/prairieisland/prairieislandord061298). Readers should further note that the cited document is an 
ordinance review by the National Indian Gaming Commission, and while the ordinance appears to have been in effect 
in the late 1990s, it may not be today; the tribe does not post a full copy of its code, and gaming revenue allocation laws 
may have changed since the 1998 review. 
22 For example, the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon Tribal Code, Section 440 
(Member Benefit Fund Ordinance) states that, absent early withdrawal for investment in education or a home purchase: 
“Each minor shall be entitled to withdraw his or her trust funds on the distribution date immediately following his or 
her 21st birthday. Such distribution shall be by transfer to the Travel Member Benefit Savings Fund where the funds 
may be accessed by each individual according to his or her needs.” Earlier in the ordinance, the member benefit funds 
are explained as follows: “The Tribe will hold the amounts of any benefit distribution made available to the members of 
the Tribe in fully invested funds managed in accordance with the disciplines specified for the Tribal Social Funds until 
each member requests withdrawal of such funds, and to credit each member’s account for its proportionate share of 
investment earnings, except when said withdrawal occurs within the first 60 days after the distribution date” (retrieved 
on August 4, 2009, from http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ 
ccfolder/gr440membene.htm). Tribal policy further provides a brief waiting period for withdrawal, encourages 
withdrawals that will be reinvested in safe but higher return opportunities, and notes the desirability of tribal citizen 
deposits into the member benefit accounts.   
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A few Native nations have made financial education mandatory for any access or for early access to 
funds.23 An increasing number offer financial education programs designed for and marketed to 
youth who will soon reach maturity and have access to their minors’ accounts.24 Curricula vary, 
although there is at least one financial education curriculum specifically designed for and widely used 
by Native communities (“Building Native Communities,” developed by First Nations Development 
Institute).25  
To best prepare young Native nation citizens, “financial” education also should include education 
about the role of tribal government. When minors’ accounts mature, tribal government will 
bequeath them with substantial resources—and there’s a possibility that in so doing, young citizens 
will get the wrong message about the function of government. Is government merely an entitlement 
agency that hands out goodies? Or is it a vehicle for tribal self-sufficiency, laying the foundation for 
long-term community success? Certainly it is the latter, and education must address this point. 
Minors’ accounts should be understood as one element in an overall policy strategy aimed at 
developing capable and engaged Native nation citizens; they should not start tribal youth on a path 
toward dependency. Nonetheless, “tribal civics” have yet to be integrated into most tribes’ youth 
financial education programming. 
Policy Lessons for CSAs 
Tribes’ experiences suggest that CSA policies must address more than revenue distribution, 
particularly if there are few restrictions on the use of the funds at maturity. In other words, 
“accounts at birth” is a tidy summary but an oversimplified approach: to increase the chances of 
success, incentives and financial education should be part of the child account policy package. 
                                                 
23 The Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana’s “Second Amended and Restated Master Trust Document” states: The term of 
this trust shall last, as to any beneficiary, until that beneficiary attains the age of twenty-one (21) years and further that 
each beneficiary shall have taken a financial planning course of no less than six (6) in-classroom hours of instruction” 
(retrieved on August 2, 2009 from http://www.tunicabiloxi.org/PDF/2ndAmendMTD.pdf). Additionally, an 
informative discussion about the financial education requirement and its perceived importance is summarized “Council 
Reviews Trust Programs,” Tribal News, 2007, retrieved on August 2, 2009, from 
http://www.tunicabiloxi.org/article_trust_program_review.php. 
24 See, for example, “Notice to All Eligible Enrolled Klamath Tribal Members,” and “Klamath Tribal Minors & Their 
Parents/Guardians: You are Invited to Attend a Financial Education Workshop,” Klamath News, January 2009, p. 4. The 
notice and invitation appear side-by-side in the newsletter and reinforce one other. The invitation is to “minors, and 
those who have reached the age of eighteen (18) or will be eighteen by June 19, 2009 and have or will obtain a GED or 
high school diploma by June 19, 2009 and your parents,” and is intended “to help prepare you to deal with money in the 
real world and to help you understand the recent market turmoil and outlook for investments” (retrieved on August 3, 
2009 from http://www.klamathtribes.org/documents/klamathnews/2009/ 
Klamath%20News%20January%202009.pdf). 
Also see Latham (2004) for a discussion of the Eastern Band of Cherokee’s program. The picture caption states, 
“Thanks to a collaborative education program, children from the Qualla Boundary reservation are taught financial 
management lessons well in advance of the time they receive their share of tribal profits” (retrieved on August 3, 2009, 
from http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/agcomm/magazine/fall04/n_extension.htm). 
25 First Nations Development Institute also provides a follow-on investor education curriculum and instructor guides 
for both courses (retrieved on August 4, 2009, from http://www.firstnations.org/default2.asp?active_page_id=298). 
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Clearly, tribes have developed numerous policy innovations to help prepare young people before 
they receive distributions. Still more policies have been discussed and recommended but not yet put 
into practice; they are part of tribal leaders’ active conversation as they seek to improve outcomes. 
Many of these ideas might be fruitfully applied to mainstream CSA policy as part of that larger 
package for success, especially if an account can be used for broader purposes than those most 
commonly proposed.26 In capsule form, they are: 
 Phased pay-outs. A phased pay-out spreads access to resources over several years. This allows 
young people to learn by doing and make mistakes without losing all of their money. 
Accelerated access to resources could be allowed for approved purposes (such as going to 
college or purchasing a home), especially if the purchase itself strengthens the account 
holder’s financial management skills.  
 Education requirements. These might include the completion of a high school diploma (or 
equivalent), completion of a college degree, and financial skills education. Of course, placing 
conditions on the receipt of account monies is much easier to do at the front end—when a 
CSA policy is developed—than after the fact, since recipients may take a very dim view of 
unilateral changes in the rules of the game. 
 Conditional transfers. These incentives could be structured either as sanctions (smaller account 
deposits by the government or sponsoring agency) for negative behaviors or as rewards 
(larger or additional account deposits) for positive behaviors. Conditional transfers make it 
possible to use CSA policy for broader social purposes—and to keep account holders on 
track for making ultimate asset purchases that build wealth. 
 Pre-K through 12 financial education. With accounts at birth, children can start thinking 
differently about money from an early age. Research supports the promise in age-appropriate 
financial education as early as pre-school (Holden, Kalish, Scheinholtz, Dietrich, & Novak, 
2009); it also points to the importance of more intensive pre-high school financial education 
(Mandell 2008). Apparently, starting early and offering ongoing learning opportunities not 
only increases the amount children learn but also increases the likelihood of future financially 
prudent behavior. However, as curricular offerings expand, cultural appropriateness is a 
concern. Mainstream approaches do not work well for some Native children (Anderson, 
Jorgensen, Brantmeier, & Mandell, 2008), and other ethnic or minority youth may experience 
similar barriers. Curricula must be created or adapted to engage students from a perspective 
that makes sense to them. 
 Basic to advanced financial education. Basic personal finance education is not enough to create 
savvy asset owners—especially if account holders receive relatively large amounts of money 
upon maturity (as can be the case with tribal minors’ accounts and in some CSA 
implementations27). Some tribes now offer well-integrated programming for youth and 
                                                 
26 Many mainstream CSA policy proposals have similar restrictions to Roth IRAs, with eligible withdrawals for post-high 
school education, homeownership, and retirement. 
27 For example, under a set of reasonable assumptions, young UK Child Trust Fund account holders may realize as 
much as £18,000, or $30,500 at current mid-2009 conversation rates (Child Trust Fund, 2009). 
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adults that addresses everything from basic financial skills to homeownership, investing, 
business management, and philanthropy.28 
 “Real” financial experiences. Opportunities to “make it real” are correlated with stronger youth 
financial literacy outcomes (Mandell 2006). In Indian Country, research suggests that having 
a job in the formal employment sector (thus experiencing first-hand the flow of wages and 
taxes) and having responsibility for some of the financial costs of a car (making or 
contributing to loan or insurance payments) are associated with higher financial literacy 
(Anderson, et al., 2008). This suggests that watching funds accumulate in a minor’s account 
or CSA may be too passive an experience to learn from; education needs to make students 
active participants in their own financial futures.29  
 Money management mentors. When children come from families with little financial expertise—
or they are at the age when the last thing they want is advice from their parents—they need 
someplace to turn for financial guidance. Recognizing this need, some tribal governments 
are considering engaging financial advisors for account holders who are nearing or at the 
pay-out point. The hope is that providing this service for a brief but critical period in a 
young adult’s life will generate life-long benefits. Even when account uses are restricted, 
young adults may benefit from professional financial advice; it can provide a dose of reality 
from a trustworthy source or expose them to ideas and opportunities that they otherwise 
might not have considered. 
Where to from Here? 
In 2007, both the National Congress of American Indians and the Native Nations Institute for 
Leadership, Management, and Policy at the University of Arizona convened tribal leaders for private 
and candid conversations about the challenges and opportunities inherent in tribal revenue 
distribution policies. Two firm conclusions emerged from these meetings—conclusions which 
mirror the ideas of this paper. First, per capita revenue distributions and minors’ accounts have 
many it possible for many Native nation citizens to build their assets (by buying or refurbishing 
homes, starting businesses, going to college or vocational school, buying cars so they can actually get 
to jobs, and so on). Second, tribal leaders and policy makers would like to do better. They would like 
to improve revenue distribution policies to boost asset building,30 and they would like to further 
develop and refine their communities’ tools for asset-building. 
                                                 
28 One example is “Salt River University,” which joins all of the courses and workshops of the Salt River Financial 
Services Institution and its partners under one umbrella; see 2006-2007 Inaugural Report, Salt River Financial Services 
Institution, p. 3, for a schematic of services and courses (retrieved August 4, 2009, from http://www.srfsi. 
com/docs/SRFSI_Innaugural_Annual_Report.pdf). 
29 The Ariel Academy in Chicago, where elementary and middle school students first learn about and then manage their 
own investment portfolio is one example of a more active approach to financial education; see “Ariel Nuveen 
Investment Program,” retrieved on August 4, 2009, from http://schools.cuip.net/ariel/?page_id=113.  
30 For example, “Since before the spring of 2004, the Tribal Council [of the Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana] has 
allowed members wishing to close out their trust accounts to submit a letter from a financial advisor stating clearly that 
the member has met with them and discussed the importance of financial planning… Discussions of late have focused 
on the importance of adhering to the more stringent requirement especially in light of the Council’s desire to have tribal 
T R I B A L  I N N O V A T I O N S  I N  C H I L D R E N ’ S  A C C O U N T S  
 
 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
 
18
In other words, Native nations have learned much about using revenue distribution to support asset 
building, but they also need more information. To that end, more opportunities for exchange among 
Native community leaders, policymakers, and researchers would be useful. Opportunities for 
collaboration among Native and mainstream policymakers and researchers are equally important.  
With converging interest around child accounts, and information to be shared in both directions, 
CSAs could be an initial focus of conversation. As a next step, research is a particularly promising 
venue for collaboration. Two of the primary obstacles to understanding how CSAs operate at 
scale—funding and data—could be addressed through creative partnerships with tribal 
governments. Because many tribes already support universal minors’ accounts, the primary funding 
challenge is eliminated. With tribal governments’ close cooperation, non-Native government or 
philanthropic funds could be used wholly for data collection and analysis. In other words, there may 
be a cost-effective way to answer many of the questions important to the field overall. For example, 
what choices do youth make for their money given phased versus in toto payouts (especially when 
these youth have not been selected for participation in a “special program”)? How much does a 
conditional early release policy affect college matriculation—do more young adults go to college if 
they have to apply for a special release of funds as opposed to simply receiving their minors’ account 
payout after high school completion? How much do different financial education regimes matter? 
Do “spend some/save some” provisions change the likelihood of future financially prudent 
behavior? And so on. 
Eventually, the conversation could (and should) be broadened from its focus on child accounts. 
Tribal experience with per capita distributions offers a particular insight into the strategic 
considerations that will face the asset-building movement in 2009 and beyond. For example, Native 
nations’ policies in support of universal, unrestricted, and life-long accounts offer broad scope for 
learning about incentives for asset building throughout citizens’ lives. Their emerging focus on the 
link between financially responsible individuals and civically responsible citizens may shed light on 
the ways financial education promotes the development of a responsible and engaged citizenry And, 
as advocates promote asset-building policy in the midst of a significant financial crisis, they will 
engage in discussions that are very similar to those that have occurred in tribal communities in the 
last decade: what balance between short- and long-term priorities and between collective and 
individual needs should American policy support?  
This paper is a first step in promoting these conversations, policy sharing, and research. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
members closing out their trusts act responsibly in the handling of their trust funds,” Tunica-Biloxi Tribe of Louisiana, 
“Council Reviews Trust Programs,” Tribal News (op cit.). 
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